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We argue that imitation is a learning response to unintelligible actions, especially to social
conventions. Various strands of evidence are converging on this conclusion, but further
progress has been hampered by an outdated theory of perceptual experience. Comparative
psychology continues to be premised on the doctrine that humans and non-human primates
only perceive others’ physical “surface behavior,” while mental states are perceptually
inaccessible. However, a growing consensus in social cognition research accepts the direct
perception hypothesis: primarily we see what others aim to do; we do not infer it from their
motions. Indeed, physical details are overlooked – unless the action is unintelligible. On
this basis we hypothesize that apes’ propensity to copy the goal of an action, rather than its
precisemeans, is largely dependent on its perceived intelligibility. Conversely, children copy
means more often than adults and apes because, uniquely, much adult human behavior is
completely unintelligible to unenculturated observers due to the pervasiveness of arbitrary
social conventions, as exempliﬁed by customs, rituals, and languages. We expect the
propensity to imitate to be inversely correlated with the familiarity of cultural practices, as
indexed by age and/or socio-cultural competence.The direct perception hypothesis thereby
helps to parsimoniously explain themost important ﬁndings of imitation research, including
children’s over-imitation and other species-typical and age-related variations.
Keywords: phenomenology, perception, symbolic culture, development, chimpanzee, social cognition,
enculturation, comparative psychology
INTRODUCTION
Theories in developmental and comparative psychology have
been undergoing drastic changes, mainly driven by unexpected
experimental ﬁndings. Not too long ago most primatologists
believed that non-human primates, including our closest rel-
atives the chimpanzees, lacked the capacity of understanding
conspeciﬁcs as other intentional agents like themselves (Tomasello,
1999). But more recent experimental designs are revealing more
of the actual extent of their social understanding (Call and
Tomasello, 2008). Similarly, there has been a trend in devel-
opmental psychology to demonstrate various aspects of social
cognition in increasingly younger human infants by using non-
verbal, behavior-based experimental paradigms, thereby contra-
dicting a long-held theory that “theory of mind” ﬁrst emerges
around 4 years of age (Baillargeon et al., 2010). These dis-
coveries have stimulated an ongoing discussion about which
theories can account for these new developmental and com-
parative data (Hutto et al., 2011). Following Gallagher, we
agree that they best ﬁt with recent theoretical developments
in social cognition research that is focused on active per-
ception, embodied cognition, and phenomenology (Gallagher
and Povinelli, 2012). We contribute to these changes by crit-
ically evaluating current theories of imitation in comparative
psychology.
Imitation is one type of social learning in which both the
form and goal of a modeled action is acquired by an agent from
another social being (e.g., Whiten and Ham, 1992; Hoppitt and
Laland, 2008). Examples of social learning are widespread among
animals: for instance, young vervet monkeys will emit “eagle”
alarm calls to almost any airborne object, including falling leaves,
and with development the response is gradually tuned to air-
borne predators only (Seyfarth and Cheney, 1986). There are a
number of ways in which one organism can inﬂuence the prob-
ability of another organism displaying a response. One animal,
for example, might be foraging in a particular location, which
draws the attention of another animal to that location (local
enhancement). The mere presence of a conspeciﬁc might trig-
ger certain responses; for instance, the probability of re-caching
food by scrub jays and ravens increases in the presence of a conspe-
ciﬁc observer (Emery and Clayton, 2001; Bugnyar and Heinrich,
2005). In this article, we are concerned with imitation; in par-
ticular, how the saliency of the observed action’s goal versus the
saliency of its physical means inﬂuences the ﬁdelity of the imi-
tative response (for a general review of social learning see, e.g.,
Hoppitt and Laland, 2008). Although imitation has been explored
in a wide variety of animal species, including dogs (e.g., Fugazza
and Miklósi, 2013), rats (e.g., Heyes et al., 1992), and pigeons
(e.g., McGregor et al., 2006), due to space limitations here we will
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focus primarily on research involving non-human and human
primates.
DEVELOPMENTS IN IMITATION RESEARCH
The speciﬁc unintelligibility of conventional practices, such as cus-
toms and language, has been emphasized decades ago (Tomasello
et al., 1993) and continues to be noted (Gergely and Csibra, 2006).
But research into imitation has so far failed to directly relate such
differences in the intelligibility of actions to qualitative differences
in the experience of observing them. Instead, it is claimed that
all actions are equally perceived as nothing but physical motions,
thus requiring mentalistic inferences about their intentions, with
some actions being more cognitively opaque than others (Csibra
and Gergely, 2006). We argue that this neglect of how different
categories of action are actually experienced, rather than intellec-
tually assessed, has long resulted in an overemphasis of the role of
inferential reasoning in imitation and of imitation’s role in copying
instrumental actions. Many studies have investigated variations in
the ﬁdelity of copying tool-based actions while neglecting imita-
tion’s role in communicative and other social practices. But this is
starting to change on the basis of recent ﬁndings in comparative
and developmental psychology.
Surprisingly, it was found that children frequently imitate
instrumental actions even if they are clearly causally unnecessary
to achieve the goal of the demonstrator, thus exhibiting so-called
over-copying (Whiten et al., 2005b) or over-imitation (Lyons et al.,
2007). For example, one 3-year-old child twisted a non-functional
pin 161 times after seeing a demonstrator twist the same pin only
16 times, in a study by Whiten et al. (1996). Over-imitation has
been consistently documented for children, but not for young and
older chimpanzees (Nagell et al., 1993; Horner and Whiten, 2005;
Whiten et al., 2005b; but see Hobaiter and Byrne, 2010), it is more
consistent in 5-year-old than in 3-year-old children (McGuigan
et al., 2007), and it has been demonstrated in a cross-cultural con-
text (Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010). Children can correctly identify
the irrelevant actions, for example as being “silly”; they do not
copy them merely to please the demonstrator, and they will even
continue copying themdespite explicit instructions to the contrary
(Lyons et al., 2007).
Given these puzzling ﬁndings it may seem that human infants
develop “towards more ‘mindless’ blanket copying” (Whiten et al.,
2009, p. 2427). However, there is a growing consensus that over-
imitation is actually a rational learning strategy of a speciﬁc class
of behaviors. While attempts to relate this phenomenon to causal
learning of complex tool-use persist (Lyons et al., 2011), there is
increasing evidence that its main purpose is the acquisition of
behavioral norms that are based on arbitrary social conventions.
Children give conventional explanations of their over-imitated
actions,“implying that what they did was prescribed (e.g., ‘I had to
do it how they showed me’ or ‘I had to do it the way they did it’)”
(Herrmann et al., 2013, pp. 540–541). They protest if others fail to
over-imitate (Keupp et al., 2013), and theywill continue protesting
even after they have seen others succeed at realizing the same goal
while omitting the causally unnecessary action (Kenward, 2013).
Accordingly, even researchers who have extensively argued that
imitation’s primary function is to enable children’s social learn-
ing of complex instrumental actions (e.g., Csibra and Gergely,
2006) are forced to modify their theories to incorporate a more
signiﬁcant role of normativity in tool-use (Király et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, we argue that this continuing focus on causal learn-
ing of cultural artifacts is a bias derived from our own modern
science- and technology-saturated cultural environment. Formost
of hominid evolutionary history, others’ intentions of tool-use and
tool-creation probably were relatively self-evident to conspeciﬁcs,
especially because for around two million years technological
development proceeded at the pace of biological evolution itself
(Ambrose, 2001).
Even unfamiliar instrumental actions can largely be under-
stood in a contextually constrained manner due to the causal
necessity of using certain actions to achieve some goal, given the
circumstances.
Unfamiliar symbolic actions, on the other hand, tend to be
utterly opaque because their underlyingmeans are not determined
by causal necessity, but by historically contingent social norms.
The conventionally constrained relationship of signiﬁer and signi-
ﬁed can be completely arbitrary and therefore must by necessity be
acquired by “blind” imitation or pedagogy. To be sure, advanced
technologies can reach similar levels of opacity, but when such
techniques ﬁrst developed in the Middle Stone Age, for exam-
ple the manufacture of compound adhesives, the prerequisites of
symbolic cognition were likely already in place (Wadley, 2011).
It is therefore possible that it was an increase in social norms
in early hominid societies, which ﬁrst necessitated an improved
capacity for faithful imitation, while the improved transmission
of advanced instrumental techniques was a beneﬁcial side-effect.
We will return to the question of the origins of human imitation
at the end of this article.
The crucial qualitative differences between perceiving contex-
tually constrained and conventionally constrained actions have
long been ignored because, as we will argue in more detail below,
the theory of perception standardly employed in comparative psy-
chology is misguided. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, have
begun to remind scientists that the intentions of most observed
actions, including instrumental actions, are directly perceivable by
others – without the necessity of having to overcome any kind of
opacity by engaging in mentalistic or behaviorist inference (Gal-
lagher and Povinelli, 2012). This direct perception of intention or
meaning makes the perception of the underlying physical details
difﬁcult – unless the other’s action is unintelligible to the observer,
for example because it is an utterance in an unfamiliar language.
This basic phenomenological insight, supported by a variety
of psychological evidence that is reviewed further below, has
important theoretical consequences for comparative psychology.
It has been widely recognized that humans are cultural ani-
mals and that it is adaptive for children to become enculturated as
fast as possible, but it has remained puzzling how they can learn
general norms from “single observations of tokens of the action”
(Rakoczy and Schmidt, 2013, p. 20), especially because it seems
that“unfortunately for children, information available in the envi-
ronment does not come tagged as being cultural” (Diesendruck
and Markson, 2011, p. 189). This puzzle has led to an emphasis
of the role of ostensive cues and pedagogy in human imitation
(Gergely and Csibra, 2006; Király et al., 2013). However, although
others can provide guidance, this help is not required for one-shot
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learning of norms. Children will interpret one unnecessary action
as conventionally constrained as long as it is performed intention-
ally (Schmidt et al., 2011). This ability is less surprising from the
phenomenological perspective because novel conventionally con-
strained actions are indeed to some extent “tagged” as such when
perceived by an observer to whom they are unfamiliar. They are
directly perceived as intentional actions, yet are simultaneously
seen as causally unnecessary and unintelligible. Importantly, this
unintelligibility also facilitates faithful imitation because percep-
tion of an action’s meaning and perception of its physical means
are co-dependent processes, which mutually exclude each other
from focus, similar to the relationship between ﬁgure and ground.
Lack of perceived meaning therefore makes the underlying phys-
ical means more salient. Of course, not every intentional action
that a child perceives to be non-sense in this way is an unfamiliar
norm-governed action, so there will be false positives, especially
in artiﬁcial experimental situations – precisely what has become
known as over-imitation.
In summary, we suggest that children’s over-imitation is a
highly selective action by which they speciﬁcally pick out those
adult actions whose meanings are perceptually unintelligible, and
which are therefore most likely determined by social convention.
The phenomenological claim that this unintelligibility is mani-
fested as a perceptual opacity, rather than as a cognitive opacity
(Gergely and Csibra, 2006), is supported by a variety of evidence,
including the fact that rational imitation can be affected by modu-
lating the perceptual salience of the observed action (Beisert et al.,
2012). More generally, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that
howweunderstandothers’actionsmodulates our perceptual expe-
rience of the underlying physical details (Teufel et al., 2010). This
and related evidence is discussed in more detail further below. We
therefore propose that children’s over-imitation is best understood
as a special instance of a more general inverse correlation between
an individual’s propensity to imitate an action and that action’s
perceptual intelligibility. We suggest that this general inverse cor-
relation is found across primates, but that humans have become
adapted to take advantage of it in the service of more effective
enculturation during their development.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL COGNITION RESEARCH
Theoretical developments in our understanding of social cog-
nition provide new perspectives for explaining discoveries in
comparative and developmental psychology (Racine and Carpen-
dale, 2007; Gallagher and Povinelli, 2012). There are at least two
important developments. First, there is the hypothesis of embod-
ied cognition (HEC), which proposes that cognition is primarily
embodied and interactive, such that real-time bodily interactions
between two or more people can be partially constitutive of some
social cognitive processes (see, e.g., De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007;
Krueger, 2011; Froese and Gallagher, 2012). Second, there is the
hypothesis of direct perception (HDP), which proposes that per-
ceptual experience primarily is a process of directly revealing or
disclosing the meaning of the perceived (Gallagher, 2008a; Zahavi,
2011). There are two complementary aspects to the HDP.
On the one hand, the HDP implies that when we perceive a
part of our physical environment, we directly perceive the mean-
ing it has for us. For example, we perceive an object in terms of its
implicit affordances for interaction (Noë, 2004), and these affor-
dances are shaped by our social context including norms of usage
(Gallagher, 2008b). On the other hand, the HDP makes a speciﬁc
claim about how we perceive other people, namely as other agents
with mental lives like ourselves. Their bodily presence is encoun-
tered as an affordance for social interaction (Krueger, 2012).
Moreover, biologically constrained bodily expressions, contextu-
ally constrained tool-use, and familiar conventionally constrained
practices are directly perceived as intentional and goal-directed.
Not all intentions are perceptually transparent to the same degree,
and some actions can be deceptive, but in everyday social encoun-
ters our direct perceptual insight is often sufﬁcient such that
reﬂection about the other’s beliefs and desires is not necessary
for successful social interaction (Ratcliffe, 2007).
Even though the HEC and the HDP can be defended indepen-
dently, they make good theoretical complements. If the HEC is
correct that aspects of social cognition can sometimes be directly
realized in embodied social interaction with others, and more gen-
erally that cognition can be directly constituted by our embodied
comportment in the world, then the HDP becomes less mysteri-
ous. The mental lives of others are perceptually accessible because
their minds are not hidden inside their brains but embodied and
realized in their actions. Other people’s minds are seen in their
worldly comportment (Krueger, 2012), and are experienced dur-
ing social interaction (De Jaegher, 2009). This is especially true of
basic emotions (Stout, 2012), but it can also hold for aspects of
the classic belief-desire psychology (e.g., I directly perceive that a
pupil believes she has failed the exam in her withdrawn expression
and slumped posture – no additional explicit thought process is
required on my part).1
OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
The rest of this article unfolds in four stages. First, we critically
examine the theory of perception that has traditionally informed
comparative and developmental psychology and show that its log-
ical consequences do not easily ﬁt with the empirical ﬁndings
of current imitation research. Then we brieﬂy review evidence
from phenomenology and psychology to independently motivate
the acceptance of a more adequate theory of perception, specif-
ically the HDP. We then argue that the logical consequences of
this hypothesis ﬁt better with what is generally known about imi-
tation, and apply the hypothesis to clarify central issues in the
debate about the development and evolution of imitation.
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE STANDARD THEORY OF
PERCEPTION FOR IMITATION
Cognitive science has traditionally treated perception as a separate
input stage that is independent of the rest of the cognitive sys-
tem. Perception is a form of information processing that converts
external physical stimuli into internal mental representations (a
1There may be other ways of defending the phenomenological insights of the HDP
apart from the HEC, for example in terms of subpersonal versions of Simulation
Theory (Gallese, 2005) andTheory Theory (Gopnik, 1993). Butwhat ismore impor-
tant here is that defenders of these competing theories are nevertheless in general
agreement that the HDP makes a valid description of our personal-level social
phenomenology (Spaulding, 2010).
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transductive process) to be used by the cognitive system for rea-
soning about the current state of the world and hence what to
do next. According to this view –we will call it the hypothesis of
physical perception (HPP) – cognition is entirely contained within
the transductive envelope of perception, and perception primarily
provides agents with a detailed set of facts about the external envi-
ronment as it is conceived of by classical physics (e.g., the position,
volume, velocity, etc., of distinct objects). If the HPP is taken as
the theoretical starting point we end up with the following logical
deduction about social cognition (Froese et al., 2012a):
HPP-(1): The intentional actions of other agents can only be
perceived as abstract physicalmotions in objective space.
HPP-(2): Given HPP-(1), the other’s agency and intentions are
not directly observed via perceptual experience2.
HPP-(3): Given HPP-(2), the other’s agency and intentions are
secondarily derived and attributed to the observed phys-
ical motions by means of additional social cognition
(e.g., a “theory of mind mechanism”).
The starting premise of this deduction, HPP-(1), is typically
phrased in the literature in terms of the metaphorical contrast
between a surface and its hidden content. For example, it was
once hotly debatedwhether chimpanzees canunderstand that con-
speciﬁcs have minds of their own, given that perception can only
provide access to“surface-level behavior,” and given that this social
ability would require them to somehow go “beneath the surface”
(Call and Tomasello, 2008, p. 187). Since it is assumed from the
beginning that perception cannot do this job (HPP-2), but there is
evidence of social understanding in chimpanzees, it is necessary to
postulate another cognitive process (HPP-3). A similar process of
reasoning is often applied to the social understanding of human
children and adults. It follows that HPP-(1) is foundational to
the concept of “theory of mind” in comparative and developmen-
tal psychology (Froese et al., 2012a). We ﬁnd explicit claims to
this effect by leading experts throughout the whole history of the
cognitive sciences.
In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the
individual imputes mental states to himself and to others (either to
conspeciﬁcs or to other species as well). A system of inferences of
this kind is properly viewed as a theory, ﬁrst, because such states are
not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to
make predictions, speciﬁcally about the behavior of other organisms.
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978, p. 515; emphasis added)
normal children give elaborate verbal descriptions of the unobservable
psychological states of people, indicating that they relate observable
actions to underlying mental states. (Meltzoff, 1995, p. 838; emphasis
added)
Generally, the observable behavior of individuals is never transpar-
ent either in respect to the background knowledge that governs their
actions or in respect to the ultimate goal of the action (if it were trans-
parent, cognitive psychology would not exist as a scientiﬁc discipline;
Csibra and Gergely, 2006, p. 252).
2We use the term “perceptual experience” rather than the more common “per-
ception”, because the latter is sometimes interpreted as referring to a subpersonal
process, while we are speciﬁcally interested in describing the subject’s own ﬁrst-
person perspective on the world. Although we sometimes use the term“perception”
out of convenience, it should always be understood in this personal-level sense.
This classic dualismbetween bodily behaviors andmental states
continues to inﬂect and bias the debate in comparative psychology
(Racine and Carpendale, 2007). For example, Call and Tomasello
(2008, p. 189) concluded that “chimpanzees, like humans, under-
stand the actions of others not just in terms of surface behaviors
but also in terms of the underlying goals, and possibly intentions,
involved” (emphasis added). In accordance with the HPP, it is
claimed that “the goals and perceptions of others are not readily
observable, and so require inferences” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 176;
emphasis added). The possibility that social understanding is a
direct perceptual achievement inmost normal situations is thereby
excluded by deﬁnition.
This limited viewof perceptual experiencehas important impli-
cations for how researchers in developmental and comparative
psychology approach the phenomenon of imitation. We can
deduce a couple of predictions about what would happen when
an agent, who is operating according to the principles of the HPP,
intends to replicate the observed behavior of another agent.
HPP-(4): GivenHPP-(2), an agent’s replicationof observedbehav-
ior is primarily guided by the other’s abstract physical
motions in objective space and its causal consequences
on the environment.
HPP-(5): GivenHPP-(3), an agent’s replicationof observedbehav-
ior can also be guidedby the other’s intention, but only to
the extent that the observer has the additionally required
social cognitive capacity.
The ways in which the replication of an observed behavior
is guided (with or without goal understanding) and performed
(copying means or ends) have been differentiated in the liter-
ature. In the absence of any goal understanding, a replication
of the means of an observed action is typically referred to as
mere “mimicry,” whereas a replication of the means that is also
guided by an understanding of the other’s goal is called “imita-
tion” (Tomasello et al., 1993). Nevertheless, this terminology is
not consistently applied in the literature since the phenomena of
neonatal imitation and children’s over-imitation arguably do not
involve an understanding of the other’s goals, and should therefore
be classed as forms of mimicry.
A replication of the effects of an action, but by other means
than those observed, is not called imitation but “emulation.” The
role of goal understanding in emulation is controversial (Huang
andCharman, 2005). It was initially proposed that emulation lacks
goal understanding, since the replication of the results could be
based on the observed results alone (Tomasello et al., 1993). But
evidence demonstrating that 18-month-old children re-enact and
complete the goals of incomplete or failed actions suggests they
employ goal emulation (Meltzoff, 1995), as does evidence that 14-
months-olds and enculturated chimpanzees emulate more often
when the reasons for the movements are clear to them (Gergely
et al., 2002; Buttelmann et al., 2007).
Thus, both the replication of means and ends may involve
(and not involve) goal understanding. According to the HPP, the
physical means and the physical outcomes of an observed action
are both given in perceptual experience, thus seemingly making
imitation easy. On the other hand, the means used to emulate
an observed result are by deﬁnition different from the means of
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the perceived action (otherwise it would be imitation), thereby
requiring a creative response so as to avoid imitation. Accordingly,
it seems that the received theory, which holds that imitation is
comparatively rarer because it is more complex than emulation,
is problematic (Call and Carpenter, 2002). Indeed, following the
logic of the HPP,we end up with precisely the opposite conclusion,
namely that exact copying of means is less complex and should
therefore be the more common form of replication. Mimicry of
observed actions is always possible without additional physical or
social cognition (i.e., reasoning about causal relations or goals),
whereas emulation always requires additional physical cognition
to devise alternative means – with or without social cognition
(although goal understanding would certainly help to inform
the creative process). The HPP-based theories thereby arrive at
a puzzling prediction:
HPP-(6): Given HPP-(4) and HPP-(5), copying the means of
an observed action is cognitively less demanding than
emulating its intended results.
This is an odd prediction because extensive research in com-
parative psychology tells us that precisely the opposite should be
the case. Faithful imitation is a much less common skill than
emulation – some have even argued that it is limited to humans
(Tomasello, 2008). But if imitation is so simple, why do non-
human primates not simply copy what they perceive? The received
view has formulated two responses.
Two decades ago it was still widely accepted that chimpanzees
imitate less than humans because they lack the required social
cognitive processes. For chimpanzees “the intentional states of the
demonstrator [are] either not perceived or irrelevant,”whereas for
humans, “the goal or intention of the demonstrator is a central
part of what they perceive” (Tomasello, 1996, p. 331)3. This initial
theory had to be revised after experimental evidence showed that
apes understand that others have goals and behave toward them
according to what they perceive. Instead it was claimed that apes
still lacked an understanding of the “more mental dimensions of
intentional action [. . .] – speciﬁcally those that have to do with
the decision-making process by which the actor generates action
plans and, based on a rational assessment of reality, chooses one
to enact in intentional action” (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 685).
However, this theory also had to be rejected because of growing
evidence that chimpanzees have a range of social skills, includ-
ing an understanding of others’ goals (Tomasello et al., 2003; Call
and Tomasello, 2008). In particular, there is evidence for rational
imitation in enculturated chimpanzees, i.e., the fact that chim-
panzees are more prone to imitate those aspects of observed action
sequences that appear to be intentionally made but whose causal
reasons are not self-evident (Buttelmann et al., 2007).
The current verdict is therefore that “[a]pes understand that
others have goals and perceptions and how these relate to one
another in intentional action, perhaps even rational action”
(Tomasello, 2008, p. 177). All of this undermines the original
hypothesis that the propensity to imitate is positively correlated
3Tomasello here seems to explicitly acknowledge that humans can directly perceive
the goals and intentions of others, as proposed by the HDP. However, to our knowl-
edge he does not further develop the implications of this phenomenological insight
in his theories.
with an understanding of other minds. Indeed, this should not
come as a surprise since even adult humans – presumably having
the most sophisticated social skills of all animals – imitate sig-
niﬁcantly less than human infants (Horowitz, 2003). It therefore
seems that other factors must be in play.
This leads us to the second response to this dilemma, which
accepts that non-human primates have intentional understanding
and that imitation should be more common among non-human
primates. For example, “mirror” neurons were ﬁrst discovered
in macaques, and a widely accepted interpretation of their func-
tion holds that intentional understanding is based primarily on
a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of
the observed actions with one’s own motor representation of those
same actions (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007). Bodily mirroring
can also be an emergent outcome of the coordination dynamics
of social interaction (Froese et al., 2012b). Given that such “motor
mimicry” is assumed to be an automatic response, and given that
it is assumed that perception delivers the requisite physical details,
it is surprising that monkeys (and primates in general) do not imi-
tate each other all the time. Consequently, some researchers have
turned their interests toward explaining the neural mechanisms
of the active inhibition and control of, rather than initiation of,
imitation (e.g., Brass et al., 2009; Rumiati et al., 2009). According
to these researchers an individual requires intentional control to
ensure that their imitation is goal-directed rather than compul-
sive (Heyes, 2009). Evidence of deferred imitation in enculturated
chimpanzees supports the claim that imitation is not a mere reﬂex
response, but rather an action that is under intentional control
(Bjorklund et al., 2002).
But this response simply brings us to another version of the
same conundrum: why do apes not disinhibit imitation more
often, especially if they apparently have sufﬁcient intentional con-
trol to inhibit its execution unless that imitative action suits their
goals? Following this response, the empirical data is still rather
puzzling because it seems to indicate that non-human primates,
for no apparent reason, reliably fail to disinhibit their existing auto-
matic imitative responses even when their intentionally directed
emulation consistently fails to bring about the desired ends. For
example, one studyof captive chimpanzees demonstrated that they
will continue begging for food in their usual, but evidently unsuc-
cessful, manner without trying to copy the successful begging
gestures of their specially trained conspeciﬁcs (Tomasello et al.,
1997). We will discuss this negative ﬁnding in more detail later on.
And if non-human primates in general seem to exhibit too
much active inhibition of imitation, then why do human children
show too little of it, as suggested by their “surprisingly unselec-
tive ‘over-imitation”’ (Whiten et al., 2009, p. 2417)? For example,
surely children have good enough physical cognition to quickly
learn when turning a pin is in fact a non-functional motion, so
why repeat that observed motion over a hundred times (Whiten
et al., 1996)? Equally surprising, from this theoretical point of
view, is the fact that imitation by adults is more like that of chim-
panzees. Lieven and Stoll (2013) reported imitation in only the
youngest children of their two-culture sample. Similarly,Horowitz
(2003) found that human adults, like chimpanzees on a similar
task, were signiﬁcantly more likely to emulate than to precisely
imitate actions that were demonstrated in the opening of an
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“artiﬁcial fruit.” And this happened even though the participants
later claimed that they had believed themselves to be imitating
all along. If they had indeed intentionally tried to disinhibit their
automatic imitative response, why did they end up emulating the
demonstration?
This tension between (a) the a priori assumption that percep-
tual experience provides a detailed mental representation of the
physical environment, including of the motions of other agents,
and (b) the empirical prevalence of emulation over imitation,
warrants a reconsideration of the general validity of the HPP.
Maybe mental states are not as perceptually hidden, and physical
details not as perceptually evident, as has been hitherto assumed
in comparative psychology.
EVIDENCE FOR THE HDP FROM PHENOMENOLOGY AND
PSYCHOLOGY
It may be argued that we cannot assess whether the HDP better
accounts for the point of view of non-human primates because
we cannot know what it is like for them to perceive the world.
However, while we can never be absolutely certain about another
agent’s ﬁrst-person experience (Nagel, 1974), this kind of certainty
is not required for doing science. It is still possible to motivate a
more general acceptance of the HDP by realizing that it accurately
describes our own point of view, and by demonstrating that its
validity can be indirectly conﬁrmed on the basis of its behavioral
consequences.
EVIDENCE FROM PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenologists have long emphasized that we normally
experience ourselves to be embodied in meaningful situations
(Heidegger, [1927] 1962; Merleau-Ponty, [1945] 2002). There is
a consensus that under normal circumstances we directly per-
ceive other persons as being intentional agents in their own right,
and that much of others’ psychological states is immediately per-
ceivable in the way in which they comport themselves in the
world, especially in social interaction (Ratcliffe, 2007; Gallagher,
2008a; Zahavi, 2011). We cannot here review the vast litera-
ture of phenomenology as it pertains to other people (but see,
e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). Instead we provide an illustra-
tive example of the phenomenological analysis of the perception
of another person’s expressions. As Scheler ([1923]2008)) once
remarked, although it may appear self-evident to “intellectualist”
(i.e., cognitivist) theories that we perceive nothing of another per-
son apart from their physical body and its objective movements in
space, it only requires the simplest reﬂection about our own lived
experience to show that there is nothing self-evident about this.
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another
person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with
his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands,
with his love in his look of affection [. . .]. If anyone tells me that this is
not ‘perception’, for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception
is simply a ‘complex of physical sensations’, [. . .] I would beg him
to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to
the phenomenological facts. (Scheler, [1923]2008, p. 260, emphasis
added).
This insight about our direct perceptual experience of other
people is not limited to the phenomenological tradition of phi-
losophy. Similar descriptions can also be found in the analytic
tradition, for example as famously expressed by Wittgenstein (see
also, e.g., McDowell, 1982).
“We see emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial con-
tortions and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom.
We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we
are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one
would like to say, is personiﬁed in the face. (Wittgenstein, quoted in
Overgaard, 2007, p. 128.)
The notion that the meaning of an expression or gesture can
be directly perceived, while physical features are relatively inacces-
sible or absent, lies at the core of our hypothesis. Even a person’s
whole physical individuality can be hidden behind their perceived
meaning. For example, Gurwitsch ([1931]1979) has observed that
other people are often primarily encountered in terms of their
social roles, and that their role partially constitutes the meaning
of a situation. He therefore remarks that individual role-bearers
can be substituted for each other without much disruption to a
social understanding of the situation, since “only in this role do
I have something to do with him. In this situation, his being is
exhausted in the role whose bearer he is” (Gurwitsch, [1931]1979,
p. 108). Of course, other people only appear as completely deﬁned
by their social roles in some generic kinds of social situation, such
as explaining directions to a stranger (as we will see in more detail
below), handing your ticket to a train conductor, etc. More would
need to be said about the ways in which others are experienced as
individual people (Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 58–84).
It is only during serious forms of psychopathology that the
world and other people are experienced as nothing but a jum-
ble of meaningless objects and mindless automata (Stanghellini,
2004). In such unfortunate cases the observer is forced to engage
in explicit reﬂection and inference-making about the meaning-
less observed movements of others (thereby effectively creating a
personal-level theory of mind4) in order to compensate for the
lack of direct perceptual insight into the intentions and mean-
ings of even the most basic kinds of actions (Froese et al., 2013).
Indeed, accounts written by sufferers of schizophrenia give us
phenomenological insight into what it could be like to only per-
ceive the meaningless “surface” behavior of another person, as is
assumed by the HPP. Consider the following description by a girl
who lost her ability to directly perceive others’ embodied mind-
edness, such that she was confronted by an unbearable perception
of another’s body as some kind of inanimate physical machine,
rather than as an expressive body of another person in their own
right:
I saw her eyes, her nose, her lips moving, heard her voice and under-
stood what she said perfectly, yet I was in the presence of a stranger.
[. . .] She seems more a statue than ever, a manikin moved by a mech-
anism, talking like an automaton. It is horrible, inhuman, grotesque.
(Renée, quoted in Sechehaye, 1970, pp. 36–38.)
4Mainstream opinion holds that many forms of psychopathology are caused by an
absence or malfunction of “Theory of Mind”, whereby the latter is deﬁned as the
process of making of inferences about other people’s states of mind on the basis
of their physical movements. However, the reverse seems to be more correct, i.e.,
that because these psychopathologies involve a disruption of our normal direct
perceptual insight into others’meaningful expressions, patients are confronted with
nothing but others’ physical movements and must therefore theorize about their
hidden meanings – with limited success (Froese et al., 2013).
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This patient’s description makes it painfully clear that the HPP
mischaracterizes our normal perceptual experience of other per-
sons. We normally do not perceive others in terms of only their
surface behavior, such as the mere movements of an automaton’s
body parts; we normally directly perceive others as living, inten-
tional agents just like ourselves, who act for reasons rather than
merely mechanically – and we realize this without any extra need
for cognizing.
EVIDENCE FROM PSYCHOLOGY
Some scientists may ﬁnd these phenomenological insights too
anecdotal to be taken seriously, but there are a number of exper-
imental paradigms in psychology that also support the HDP and
that undermine the guiding assumptionof theHPP, i.e., thatwe are
normally presented with a highly detailed physical environment in
our perceptual experience. We begin by highlighting evidence that
the perceivedmeaning of an object partially hides its physical char-
acteristics. We then discuss evidence that the perceived meaning
of a situation can even hide whole objects and personal identities.
First, experiments in categorical perception have repeatedly
demonstrated that our perceptual experience is shaped by a so-
called“perceptualmagnet effect,”which implies that the structures
of our experience are partially constituted by our learned concep-
tual categories (Harnad, 2003). Certain physical details will be
more or less accessible to experience depending on the categories
by which we make sense of the world. Regarding social perception
it has been demonstrated that our conceptual categories inﬂu-
ence how we perceive others’ vocalizations (Iverson et al., 2003)
as well as their facial expressions (Kotsoni et al., 2001). For exam-
ple, discriminating others’ facial expressions within a meaningful
category of emotion is more difﬁcult than discriminating them
across different categories, even if they differ by an equal physical
amount (Etcoff and Magee, 1992). Speciﬁcally, given a computer-
generated continuum of facial expressions from happy to sad, it is
more difﬁcult to tell apart two images of happy faces (or sad faces)
than to differentiate between two images of faces that express an
undeﬁned feeling between happy and sad. Anticipation of emo-
tions can also lead to the misperception of facial details (Palumbo
and Jellema, 2013).
Systematic cultural differences in perception and social cogni-
tion have also long been reported by ethnographers (e.g., Lillard,
1998; Vinden, 1999; Boesch, 2007; Henrich et al., 2010). In psy-
chology there is a ﬁeld of study dedicated to elucidating how the
natural and socio-cultural context of the perceiver shapes their
experience, including their susceptibility to illusions (Caparos
et al., 2012). There is also growing evidence that believing others to
be intentional agents has top-down effects on perception, such as
modulating how their physical movements are perceived (Moore
et al., 2013) and on mechanisms of attentional selection (Wiese
et al., 2012). The fact that there is a co-dependence between basic
sensory processing of others’ physical characteristics and higher-
level social understanding of others has been taken to support
Wittgenstein’s observation that we experience ourselves as directly
seeing other people’s emotions, intentions, and attention (Teufel
et al., 2010).
Since it may be difﬁcult to intuitively grasp what it means to
fail to notice physical details when perceiving another’s body, the
reader is encouraged to experience this effect from her own ﬁrst-
person perspective.We therefore reproduce the“Thatcher illusion”
(Thompson, 1980), which is particularly relevant for generaliz-
ing these kinds of ﬁndings to comparative psychology, because it
has been demonstrated to apply to the perception of non-human
primates as well, including chimpanzees and, to a lesser extent,
monkeys (Nakata and Osada, 2012; Weldon et al., 2013). The per-
ceiver sees two seemingly similar pictures of a smiling face when
these pictures are positioned upside down, but not when they are
turned to their upright position (Figure 1).
The effects of the Thatcher illusion are still relatively subtle, but
“change blindness”(Simons andRensink,2005) and“in attentional
blindness” (Mack, 2003) paradigms in psychology have provided
extensive evidence that we often fail to notice substantial changes
in a visual scene, such as the changing color of a car or the dis-
appearance of a plane’s engines, even when asked to look for any
changes taking place. Moreover, it appears to the participants that
they perceive the scene as a whole without any factual gaps. While
unusual orientations, ﬂickering, splashes, and other artiﬁcial tech-
niques help, they are not needed to induce these effects. Consider,
for instance, the “gorillas in our midst” experiment (Simons and
Chabris, 1999)5. Participants were instructed to count the number
of basketball passes between members of one team of basketball
players, all wearing the same-colored shirts. In the middle of the
video a person dressed up in a full-body gorilla suit strolls right
into the midst of the passing players. The “gorilla” stops to face the
camera, pounds its chest, and then wanders off. Incredibly, around
50% of people fail to notice that anything out of the ordinary has
taken place.
Researchers also found perceptual “blindness” in real-life social
situations (Simons and Levin, 1998). They had an assistant pre-
tend to be lost on campus and then to approach a randompasserby
for directions and for help in using a map. In the middle of
5The video is available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo.
FIGURE 1 |The “Thatcher illusion ” (Thompson, 1980). We ﬁrst see two
more-or-less identical faces. However, when they are turned around 180◦ to
their proper orientation, it turns out that one face had been manipulated.
These abnormal physical details had previously been perceptually obscured
behind the meaningful experience of seeing a replication of the left-hand
image. (This ﬁgure was ﬁrst published in Thompson, P. “Margaret Thatcher:
a new illusion” Perception, 1980, 9, pp. 483–484, reproduced by kind
permission of Pion Ltd, London.Website: www.perceptionweb.com).
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this interaction two other assistants carrying a large opaque door
rudely barged through the two interactants. During this brief
interruption the “lost” person was quickly replaced with another
person playing the same role, and afterwards the interaction con-
tinued. Astonishingly, in about 50% of cases the passerby failed
to notice that their interlocutor had been swapped for a different
person. In one variation of the experiment the two swapped peo-
ple were both dressed as construction workers. The researchers
comment: “One subject who failed to detect the change essen-
tially stated our predicted hypothesis: She said that she had just
seen a construction worker” (Simons and Levin, 1998, p. 648).
They concluded that, provided that the overall meaning of the
scene is unchanged, physical changes to seen persons often escape
awareness even when they occur during a natural, real-world
interaction.
These ﬁndings are surprising from the representationalist per-
spective of the HPP, but they are in accordance with the HDP.
Absence of physical details is to be expected if experience is primar-
ily about situating perceivers in a meaningful and goal-directed
relationship with their environment, for example based on our
capacities for action (Noë, 2002). And the same applies to our
experience of other people. For example, the person-swapping
experiments provide empirical support for the phenomenological
analysis by Gurwitsch ([1931]1979) about how other people are
often primarily perceived in terms of their social roles. Although
more comparative research needs to be done in order to determine
to what extent these ﬁndings can be generalized to the perceptual
experience of non-human primates, there are no a priori reasons
to assume that they are exempt from meaningful perception and
its consequences. Moreover, as the next section demonstrates,
such a generalization is theoretically supported because of the
parsimonious account it provides for comparative research on
imitation.
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE HDP REGARDING
IMITATION
We are now in a position to take a closer look at the logical
consequences of the HDP for current issues in imitation research.
HDP-(1): The intentional actions of other agents are primar-
ily perceived in terms of their meaning and goal-
directedness.
HDP-(2): Given HDP-(1), the other’s abstract physical motions in
objective space are not primarily observed via perceptual
experience.
HDP-(3): Given HDP-(2), observation of the other’s abstract
physical motions in objective space requires additional
cognitive effort.
Note that HDP-(2) is a less constraining consequence than
HPP-(2), because even though direct perception is the normal
default mode, perception of physical details is not necessarily
impossible altogether. But the HDP predicts that perception of
abstract physical details of meaningful actions requires additional
cognitive effort of some kind, such as detached observation, con-
trolled shifts of attention, explicit analysis of isolated perceptual
stimuli, and so forth. This has logical implications for the way in
which observed actions can be replicated.
HDP-(4): Given HDP-(2), an agent’s replication of the observed
behavior of another agent is primarily guided by the
other’s perceived goals.
HDP-(5): Given HDP-(3), an agent’s replication of the observed
behavior of another agent can also be guided by the
other’s perceivedphysicalmotions, but only to the extent
that the observer has the required additional capacities.
We therefore arrive at the following prediction:
HDP-(6): Given HDP-(4) and HDP-(5), copying the means of
an observed action is cognitively more demanding than
emulating its intended results.
In other words, according to the HDP, because the physical
details of an observed meaningful action tend to be obscured by
top-down effects on perception, the default mode of replicating
behavior is emulation. On this view, and in direct contrast to the
traditional view of imitation (e.g., Tomasello, 1999), understand-
ing the other’s goals and intentions does not facilitate imitation,
but actually hinders it because such direct insight obscures the
precise means. Imitation requires individuals to change atten-
tion from what the other’s goals are to how the other’s actions
are precisely realized, while emulation is possible without this
extra effort. This proposal better accords with the fact that faithful
imitation is less common in non-human primates although they
have a range of social capacities, including goal understanding
(Tomasello, 2008, p. 177).
It could be countered that neonates lack the requisite cogni-
tive skills to control their focus of attention, and yet they are
still able to imitate with ﬂexibility. However, the need for higher-
level cognition to reveal the physical details of the means of an
observed action is premised on the fact that the action has an
intelligible goal. But if the other’s goal is completely unintelligi-
ble, for example because it is an unfamiliar conventional practice,
then there is no perceived meaning that could be competing per-
ceptually and attentionally with recognition of the ﬁne-grained
physical means of the other’s action. In other words, if the other’s
goal is not directly perceptually given, then a replication of the
observed behavior should be more easily guided by its actual
physical execution – without any need for extra cognitive effort.
These considerations amount to the related hypothesis that an
individual’s propensity to emulate is dependent on the direct intel-
ligibility of the observed action. Conversely, imitation is expected
to be more frequent whenever the goal of the other’s action is per-
ceptually opaque. According to HDP, therefore, it is possible to
evaluate the space of observable actions according to their poten-
tial direct perceptual intelligibility when viewed by a conspeciﬁc.
We propose three broad partially overlapping categories that lead
from intelligibility to opacity:
(1) Biologically constrained behavior (completely intelligible to
conspeciﬁcs),
(2) Contextually constrained behavior (partially intelligible to
conspeciﬁcs), and
(3) Conventionally constrained behavior (completely unintelligi-
ble, unless seen by an enculturated group member).
The category of “biologically constrained behavior” includes
all communicative expressions and actions whose meaning and
goals are constrained by species-speciﬁc biology. Understanding
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of such actions is instinctual. For example, awolf will nevermisun-
derstand a conspeciﬁc wagging its tail. We predict that copying of
this kind of behavior will nearly always be emulative, while precise
imitation is exceedingly difﬁcult because it requires a concerted
effort of detachment and analysis (although in practice the lim-
ited number of alternative means to achieve the same result may
make this replication appear close to copying the means).
The category of “contextually constrained behavior” includes
more ambiguous action types, because intelligibility also depends
on the relation of the observed behavior to the observed social
and natural context. The more species-atypical and mediated the
action is, the less intelligible it appears. For example, when one ape
observes another one reaching into a tree, grabbing something and
then putting it into its mouth, this should be directly perceived as
feeding without need for reﬂection. Intelligibility of this behavior
is not simply determined by species-speciﬁc biology, but rather
enabled by the characteristics of the situation, i.e., by directly
observing the effects that an action has on the environment. On
the other hand, the paradigmatic class of moremediated behaviors
is the learned use of tools, for example when a chimpanzee uses a
stick to ﬁsh for insects or honey (Humle et al., 2009). The way in
which a behavior of this category will be copied depends on how
self-evident its function is. The defaultmode of copyingwill still be
emulation. However, aspects of instrumental action and tool-use
whose intentions are obscured, including conventionally deter-
mined norms of behavior, require closer observation and more
imitative learning, thereby leading to the emergence and preser-
vation of cultural traditions that are not determined by functional
considerations alone. While most pronounced in humans, such
traditions have also been demonstrated in non-human primates,
including chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999), orangutans (Krützen
et al., 2011), and capuchin monkeys (Perry, 2011).
Uniquely, the perceived meaning of a “conventionally con-
strained behavior” is neither constrained by an internal biological
necessity nor by the external environment. Instead, the relation-
ship between a behavior and its meaning is primarily based on
a social convention that is largely arbitrary. The reasons for the
speciﬁc form of the relationship are irrelevant and usually not
known to the community. Although not absent in non-human
primates, this category of behaviors is especially typical for human
actions, including language, customs, and rituals. More recently,
it also includes writing and complex technology. In these cases the
default mode of copying an observed behavior will be imitation,
at least for young children and other cultural outsiders, because
its meaning is not directly intelligible without having already been
enculturated. Our theory therefore predicts that imitation is most
frequently done by young individuals in response to the perception
of unfamiliar social behavior while developing in a richly symbolic
culture.
We also predict that the more an action is conventionally con-
strained, the more it will be faithfully imitated by group members,
thereby restricting variation in performances of that action within
the community. For example, in the case of chimpanzees we there-
fore expect there to be more variation in using a stick to ﬁsh for
termites (a mostly contextually constrained action) in contrast
to the hand–clasp interaction during mutual grooming (a mostly
conventionally determined action). However, this prediction is
also age-dependent. During enculturation imitation is eventually
replaced by emulation, because as the meaning of conventionally
constrained actions is learned, their meaning will become per-
ceptually transparent just at the same time as the perception of
their underlying physical means will require increasing effort. As
we know in the case of humans, the perception of certain physi-
cal details will eventually become nearly impossible for adults, for
example the distinction between the sounds of the English “l” and
“r” by adult Japanese speakers.
Regarding non-human primates there is a classic experiment
conducted by Tomasello et al. (1997), which investigated imita-
tion in response to a novel arbitrary social gesture that did not
involve tool-use in two groups of captive chimpanzees. Since the
outcome of this experiment at ﬁrst sight appears to contradict our
theory, we will consider it in more detail here. On three occasions
the experimenters temporarily separated a dominant female chim-
panzee from her group to extensively train her alone to perform an
arbitrary gesture to receive treats. After the trained chimpanzees
were returned to their groups, they were called to the fence where
they spontaneously began to perform the learned gesture, and
thus received the coveted treats in full view of the other members
of their group. The other members were highly motivated to get
their own treats, but they performed their usual begging gestures
to the experimenters; none of them attempted to imitate the new
gestures of the trained chimpanzees.
However, worries have already been raised about the possibility
that negative ﬁndings derived from experimental paradigms using
food-related actions might fail to generalize to the imitation of
social conventions (Watson and Caldwell, 2009). Relatedly, from
the perspective of our theory, the main problem with this partic-
ular study is that it tried to replace an existing instinctive gesture
with a novel gesture within a highly familiar context, i.e., begging
from humans. The highly familiar situation of food-procurement
enables chimpanzees to directly understand a conspeciﬁc’s begging
action as such in a contextually enabled manner, no matter that it
is performed differently. This social understanding of the other’s
goal, according to our theory, makes emulation the more likely
response. Moreover, there already existed an instinctual response,
the open-hand begging gesture, which is universally understood
by humans and chimpanzees alike. Indeed, the experimenters
recorded these normal begging gestures, showing that there was no
communication problem as such. The chimpanzees understood
what the trained chimpanzees were doing, i.e., begging for food,
and they also understood that the experimenters understood what
they themselves were doing, i.e., begging as well. Given this general
understanding of the situation by the observing chimpanzees, our
theory predicts correctly that the physical details of the trained
gestures were obscured behind a direct perception of the other’s
goals, thereby leading to emulation.
Note that the two theories of perception make differing pre-
dictions regarding the role of perception and intelligibility for
imitation. First, whereas the HPP entails that the understand-
ing of a perceived action is a secondary, independent cognitive
process, the HDP entails that understanding cannot be easily sep-
arated from perception itself. As we have shown, there is a growing
body of evidence to support the latter assertion. In terms of mea-
surable effects on imitation, there is at least one study of that
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directly manipulated perceptual experience, and the results are
better accommodated by the HDP. It was found that perceptual
salience of the demonstrated behavior, as varied by familiarization
and distractors, modulates infants’ propensity for rational imita-
tion (Beisert et al., 2012). For instance, when an adult operated a
light switch using their head while their hands were visibly unoc-
cupied, 10 out of 14 (73.3%) infants imitated the action, which
seems like a rational choice because there could have been an
important reason for avoiding the easier option of using the hands.
But when the experiment was repeated with two distracting smi-
ley faces placed on the table, one next to each of the unoccupied
hands, the tendency for such “rational imitation” was attenuated:
although the rational choice should have been the same as before,
only 8 out of 15 infants imitated the action (53.3%; Beisert et al.,
2012, p. 3). It is therefore possible that somenegative results of imi-
tation in non-human primates also suffered from the perceptual
effects of distraction and lack of salience.
Second, whereas the HPP entails that the physical details
of the world are just as easily perceived no matter their intel-
ligibility, because intelligibility is a later stage of inferential
processing, the HDP entails that physical details and intel-
ligibility are in conﬂict with each other. To be sure, both
the HPP and the HDP are compatible with ﬁndings showing
that diminished intelligibility is positively correlated with imi-
tation. But whereas the HDP leads us to the prediction that
imitative responses become less frequent with increased intelli-
gibility, the HPP is neutral on this point or even predicts the
opposite, e.g., the traditional hypothesis that humans have a
greater ability for imitation compared to chimpanzees because
humans are better at making sense of others’ goals (i.e., only
they have a “theory of mind”). It is therefore also possible
to arbitrate between these theories by evaluating the extent to
which the absence of imitation is related to the presence of
intelligibility.
THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF
IMITATION
We ﬁnish by contrasting the consequences of the HPP and HDP in
terms of theories of the development and evolution of imitation.
EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMITATION
Imitation starts from the ﬁrst moments of life. For example,
it has been found that human neonates can imitate a variety
of arbitrary facial gestures (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977), but so
can chimpanzee neonates (Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2006; Bard, 2007)
and even macaque neonates (Ferrari et al., 2006). Delayed imita-
tion studies with 1-week-old rhesus macaques suggest that these
are not mere reﬂexes, but are to some extent under intentional
control (Paukner et al., 2011). This prevalence of early imita-
tion is what we would predict given that young infants do not
yet have well-developed social understanding of even the most
basic gestures, and are thus more likely to perceive physical
features. Conversely, it is expected that this precise imitation
decreases as basic social competence increases, because the devel-
opment of categorical perception and social understanding will
start to obscure the physical details of what is directly per-
ceived as meaningful. And, indeed, it is well known that human
neonatal imitation disappears after 2–3 months of age (Jones,
2009), and a similar developmental trend exists for chimpanzee
neonates:
At less than 7 days of age, the chimpanzees could discriminate between
and imitate several human facial gestures. However, by the time they
were 2 months old, the chimpanzees no longer imitated the gestures.
They began to perform the mouth pen (MO) gesture frequently in
response to any of the three facial gestures presented to them. This
response could be considered as“social smiling”(i.e., play face) directed
at the human experimenter (Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2006, pp. 223–224).
Myowa-Yamakoshi (2006) also noted that the disappearance
of facial imitation might be related to social-interactive responses
toward the experimenter. We agree and suggest that the physi-
cal realization of the facial gesture, i.e., face with/without tongue
and/or lip protrusion, has become perceptually obscured by the
acquired basic social understanding. The otherwise puzzling dis-
appearance of neonatal imitation in human and non-human
primates can therefore be understood in terms of the devel-
opment of a basic, still largely biologically constrained, social
competence.
Young humans’ propensities for faithful imitation of arbi-
trary gestures reliably reappear after 1.5–2 years of age (Jones,
2009). Infants’ over-imitation of tool-related actions, even of evi-
dently unsuccessful ones, increases with age, becoming the default
response after around 2 years of age (Nielsen, 2006). This reap-
pearance of imitation could reﬂect a new social learning process
that speciﬁcally responds to the unintelligibility of conventionally
constrained behavior, such as culturally mediated social interac-
tion. Relatedly, we expect that emulation will once again become
the default mode of imitation in adults, because most convention-
ally constrained actions will by then have become perceptually
intelligible, thereby once again obscuring the underlying means.
Indeed, in Horowitz’s (2003) study of adult human imitation the
details of the demonstrator’s motions apparently remained out-
side of the observer’s perceptual focus, as conﬁrmed by anecdotal
reports: “In casual conversation during the debrieﬁng period, 1
subject remarked after hearing that the experiment gauged her
level of imitation ‘Oh, you mean when I saw you messing with
the box, if I imitate that?’ ” (Horowitz, 2003, p. 333). We suggest
that the participants primarily saw the demonstration as a general
“messing about”whose physical details were perceptually obscured
by the self-evident goal of opening the device.
Interestingly, a similar later developmental trend has been
observed in the case of chimpanzees. After the disappearance of
neonatal imitation, a reemergence of precise imitation has been
observed to occur around 9 months of age (Myowa-Yamakoshi,
2006). In one ﬁeld study several young chimpanzees, but none of
the adults, were documented to imitate the idiosyncratic actions
of a disabled adult chimpanzee (Hobaiter and Byrne, 2010).
Thus, at some point the propensity for imitation in young chim-
panzees decreases once again, as is also demonstrated by a host of
experiments involving captive adult chimpanzees (e.g., Tomasello
et al., 1987, 1997; Nagell et al., 1993; Bjorklund et al., 2002). This
broad similarity to the non-linear development of imitation in
young humans suggests that juvenile chimpanzees may also aim
to acquire the conventionally determined behavior of their group.
Frontiers in Psychology | Comparative Psychology February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 65 | 10
Froese and Leavens The direct perception hypothesis
EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF IMITATION
One popular hypothesis is that human imitation ﬁrst emerged
because of a necessity for young individuals to learn complex
tool-making techniques (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). The main
idea is that humans are more prone to imitation because natural
selection honed them to focus their attention on others’ complex
tool-related actions, rather than just their goals or effects on the
environment (Tomasello, 2008, pp. 208–209). At the same time
it is recognized that the success of imitative learning depends
not so much on slavishly copying the others’ movements, but
also on a hierarchical analysis of overall goals and plans leading
to “program-level” imitation (see also, e.g., Byrne and Russon,
1998; Tomasello et al., 2005). On this view, faithful imitation
was only later adapted for imitating socially determined behavior
(Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 687).
We agree that successful imitation depends on learning to refo-
cus attention to speciﬁc aspects of observed actions, although our
account differs slightly. Evidence for so-called“program-level imi-
tation” (Byrne, 2003) ﬁts with the idea that observers ﬁrst perceive
the other’s general intention, while refocusing on the physical
details of the component movements requires additional effort.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis that precise imitation in humans
evolved speciﬁcally because of the need to copy complex tool-use
does not sit easily with the experimental evidence. Over-imitation
by children and under-imitation by adults are puzzling phenom-
ena if precise copying of tool-based functionality was the primary
evolutionary pressure for human imitation.
There is another issue with the hypothesis of tool-related ori-
gins of imitation, which is the tendency of overestimating the
opacity of observed tool-use behavior. Apart from complex mod-
ern technology, most learning of new tool-use practices can be
guided by close observation and practice, as demonstrated by
young chimpanzees in thewild (Inoue-Nakamura andMatsuzawa,
1997; Biro et al., 2006). However, no matter how many times you
say “bring me that ball” to a pre-linguistic infant, the meaning
of this communicative action will remain elusive unless it is tied
into a pragmatic context involving the speaker, the listener, and a
ball (Tomasello et al., 1993). We therefore agree with Csibra and
Gergely (2009) that the acquisition of human cultural practices is
facilitated by specialized gestures, such as faithful imitation and
ostensive signals. However, on our view, they misjudge what pre-
cisely is special about human culture by accepting the HPP as their
starting point.
[T]o acquire the relevant knowledge through observation sets an
ill-posed inverse problem: a behavior can always be generated and
explained by an inﬁnite number of different mental state combina-
tions, representing diverse goals and/or different types of background
knowledge. This difﬁculty is just multiplied when observing mediated
(recursive) tool use [e.g. when one tool is used to produce another
tool], where no perceptible reward would inform the observer about
the tool’s function and, in the absence of that, there is no way to assess
the relevance of any element of the behavior observed. (Csibra and
Gergely, 2006, p. 252.)
The HPP commits Csibra and Gergely to the questionable
claim that, from the point of view of an external observer, any
behavior could be caused by an “inﬁnite” number of mental states
because nothing but the physical states of an action are observ-
able. However, according to the HDP, such an absolute “inverse
problem” normally does not exist in practice, even when observ-
ing recursive tool-use. Csibra and Gergely illustrate the concept of
recursive tool-use by contrasting a child’s observation of someone
using a tool to peel away the hard skin of a fruit (presumably to
eat its interior) compared to the child observing someone using
a tool to carve away bits of a piece of wood (presumably to make
a pointy spear). We agree that the latter, recursive action would
be less intelligible than the former, but many of its aspects would
still be sufﬁciently contextually constrained to be intelligible for
the child. For example, the wood carver’s attention will be focused
on the shape of the tip (and not on the ﬂakes falling down or the
sounds that are made); he may look at it, feel it with his ﬁngers,
clean away bits that get stuck, etc. He may also throw the spear
at some target to check its effectiveness, and if not satisﬁed, con-
tinue carving some more. Once done, he will take the resulting
spear on the hunt where its utility in killing prey will be put to
the test; if it happens to break, he may carve a new tip. In other
words, the meaning of the tool-based making of this tool is largely
intelligible because it is embedded in contextually constrained
practices.
To be sure, Csibra and Gergely’s general hypothesis that imita-
tion is related to the copying of unintelligible behaviors matches
our own theory (see also Gergely and Csibra, 2006), but their
commitment to the HPP prevents them from appreciating the
qualitative difference between observing tool-use (even of the
recursive kind) and observing actions that are based entirely on
social conventions. We argue that it is only when the child is
observing an unfamiliar conventionally constrained behavior that
she is in fact confronted by genuine opacity. This is why over-
imitation, as well as pedagogy (Csibra, 2007), are observed mainly
in humans: our survival and success depends on learning social
conventions. Young non-human primates are also keen to learn
tool-based actions from adults and exhibit some imitative learn-
ing. For example, young chimpanzees engage in long periods of
observational learning of cracking nuts by using an anvil and ham-
mer stone (Biro et al., 2006), and young capuchin monkeys have
also shown to exhibit observational learning of tool-use (Fredman
and Whiten, 2008). But, as far as we know, young non-human
primates in thewild, in the absence of extensive symbolicallymedi-
ated social conventions like those characterizing humans, have to
learn only a limited number of arbitrary social conventions in
order to become successful group members, and the opacity of
others’ actions is therefore more manageable.
The unique perceptual opacity of unfamiliar conventionally
constrained behavior also helps to clarify the relationship between
imitation and social conformity. It has been hypothesized that
the higher prevalence of imitation in humans could derive from
their need to enact an appropriate sociocultural identity so as
to become an accepted member of their social group. On this
view, human imitation is premised on a shared social contract,
whereas “there is no good evidence that apes imitate others only
for social conformity and/or solidarity” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 213).
We agree with the idea that imitation helps young humans to
develop into successful members of their group, but we argue that
this phenomenon is not strictly limited to humans.
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For example, an experiment with captive chimpanzees has
found that adults tend to conform to norms of tool-use even if
other styles of usage are known (Whiten et al., 2005a). That this
social conformity is partially related to afﬁrming group member-
ship cannot be ruled out. For instance, chimpanzee neonates are
more likely to imitate in a communicative situation (Bard, 2007),
and young chimpanzees rarely imitate facial gestures in the absence
of ongoing bodily contact with the demonstrator, which sug-
gests that social bonding is an essential element of their imitation
(Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2006). Solidarity is also observed. For exam-
ple, adult chimpanzees help each other upon request even when
there is no immediate possibility for reciprocity (Yamamoto et al.,
2009), and they console victims of bullying (Fraser et al., 2008).
Adult bonobos collaboratively share food in the wild (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998, pp. 219–225). These ﬁndings are not
restricted to apes. Conformity to social norms of food prefer-
ence is documented for wild vervet monkeys (van der Waal et al.,
2013), and imitation has been shown to enhance social bonding
in capuchin monkeys (Paukner et al., 2009). However, despite this
growing evidence of social conformity and solidarity, there is little
evidence of over-imitation in non-human primates.
These considerations lead us to formulate a revised hypoth-
esis regarding the origin of imitation in humans. We agree with
Tomasello (2008) that the greater prevalence of imitation in young
humans is related to the formation of a shared social contract, but
we specify that this is because the human social contract is deﬁned
by conventionally constrained practices. Our social identities are
largely constituted by the arbitrary symbol systems in which we
grow up. From this perspective it is no longer surprising that
human children are especially prone to over-imitation. Their best
bet of becoming enculturated into their social group is by focus-
ing their imitative learning on opaque actions whose function
does not appear contextually constrained. Over-imitation is there-
fore far from being surprisingly unselective. It is a highly selective
behavior that picks out precisely those aspects of social interaction
that aremost likely part of conventionally constrained practices. In
other words, over-imitation is an effective developmental response
to becoming enculturated in a symbolic culture. Similarly, encul-
turated apes – apes who were cross-fostered by humans and who
have been embedded in richly symbolic environments – imitate
arbitrary actions more readily than do other institutionalized apes
(Custance et al., 1995; Rumbaugh et al., 2008).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
All theories of imitation agree that the more conventionalized
social interactions are, the more imitative social learning is
required to become a successful member of the group. However,
theories based on the HPP and our theory based on the HDP
differ in one crucial respect: the former are united by the assump-
tions that physical details are always and exclusively perceived,
and that this perceptual access is independent of any subsequently
realized intelligibility. Our proposal proceeds on experimental
and phenomenological insights that the direct perception of an
action’s goal and meaning is primary, and that there is therefore a
conﬂict between perception of physical details and their intelligi-
bility. Perception and intelligibility are joined together in a process
of sense-making that accords primacy to meaning over physical
details whenever this is possible, and if not counteracted by extra
cognitive effort. Replacing the HPP with the HDP leads us to make
several predictions that better ﬁt the data.
We expect that an individual developing in a highly con-
ventional cultural context will be more prone to faithfully imi-
tate, as most theories of imitation do; but we explain this
insight more consistently than other theories by emphasizing
that conventionally constrained behaviors are uniquely opaque
to young and uninitiated observers when compared to other
types of action. We go against existing theories by predicting
that an individual’s propensity to imitate is inversely correlated
with her development and enculturation, as indexed for example
by age and social competence. Rather than facilitating imita-
tion, the acquisition of social understanding grants the observer
direct perceptual intelligibility of others’ behaviors, such that
emulation will ultimately become the default mode of copying
behavior in adulthood. Faithful imitation, on the other hand,
will increasingly require additional effort because the underlying
physical details of others’ expressions will become perceptually
obscured behind their directly understood signiﬁcance. The pro-
posed inverse correlation between direct perception and faithful
imitation also explains why emulation is comparatively more fre-
quent in non-human primates, since most of their behaviors
are instinctively and contextually intelligible while only a few
behaviors are conventionally constrained. In this way the HDP
is able to explain a wider range of data in a more parsimonious
manner.
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